

## Paper 1: "Do equal claims imply equal chances of an indivisible good?"

The case for holding a lottery to distribute a good to those with equal claims to it is often illustrated with scenarios involving a life-saving good which is indivisible and therefore cannot go to more than one person. All would be equally well off if it went to nobody. But this is true only insofar as all would be equally badly off because dead. One can, however, distribute something of greater value to each than the certainty of an imminent death: namely a chance of living. For each person, the higher this chance, the greater its value. Hence it appears that one should satisfy their equal claims by giving each the highest equal chance of living. This would strike many as a fair and reasonable means of treating people as equals.

In a challenge to such a case for the distribution by lot, some have argued that the chance of receiving the good at issue is lacking in value or otherwise insignificant or irrelevant in comparison with actually receiving this good. It has been suggested, for example, that chances are irrelevant since their contribution to a person's well-being pales in significance in comparison with the actual receipt of the good that is distributed by lot.

In the first two sections of this paper, I answer the above, and related, challenges to the relevance and significance of chances. As I argue in Section I, the greater significance of receiving all of an undivided good does not necessarily distinguish equal chances of the whole good from an outcome involving equally divided portions of this good. I argue in Section II that it mislocates the value of lottery chances to assume that they must contribute, in themselves, to a person's well-being. Rather their significance primarily resides in their expected instrumental value in delivering goods of independent value. In Section III, I provide an account of when distribution by lot is perfectly fair in spite of the inevitability of an unequal outcome among equal claimants.