

## Paper 2: “Person-Affecting Consequentialism and Claims”

The narrow all-things-considered person-affecting principle states: one outcome is not morally better than a second unless better for at least one person. The narrow in-a-respect person-affecting principle states: one outcome is not morally better than a second in any respect unless better for at least one person.

In the variable-population context, the narrow all-things-considered person-affecting principle has wildly counterintuitive implications—if, as is commonly assumed, the well-being of an existing person cannot be compared with their nonexistence. In the fixed-population context, the narrow in-a-respect person-affecting principle has been decried by egalitarians. More surprisingly, that principle is rejected even by some prioritarrians.

This paper seeks to bring clarity to the debate about the principles, by studying the underlying axiology that warrants them. A narrow person-affecting axiology (NPA axiology) is such that individuals’ well-being gains and losses are the fundamental pro tanto moral factors determining the moral ranking of outcomes. NPA axiology is precisified via a specific model of how losses and gains determine moral betterness: the *claims-across-outcomes* model. A claim is a relation between a given individual and a pair of outcomes, with different possible valences: if an individual is better off in outcome *x* than *y*, they have a claim in favor of *x* over *y*; if they are equally well off, they have a null claim; if they are incomparably well off, they have an incomparable claim. Non-null claims also have a strength—determined both by the individual’s well-being and, potentially, by non-well-being features of them (desert).

NPA axiology without well-being comparisons to nonexistence is a nonstarter. Instead, this paper studies NPA axiology on the premise that such comparisons are possible. With this premise in hand, and using the claims-across-outcomes model, the paper argues that NPA axiology yields an outcome ranking that: satisfies the Pareto principles; is equity-regarding, in the sense of satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle; is neutral to desert (it turns out that allowing desert to influence claim strength produces serious difficulties); and leads to the Repugnant Conclusion.